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Abstract 
 This study examines the dynamic effect of disability on marriage. Data on disability and 
marriage come from the New Beneficiary Survey, designed to characterize new beneficiaries of 
the Social Security Disability Insurance Program. Using an event-study model, the study finds 
that disability onset decreased marriage among beneficiaries, but only at younger ages. The study 
further examines whether the effect of disability on marriage is due to formation, dissolution, or 
both, and whether the effect varies by educational attainment and subsequent mortality. The 
results highlight the importance of marriage selection in the oft-cited relationship between 
marriage and better health. 
JEL No. J1, I1 
Keywords: Marriage selection, marriage formation, marriage dissolution, disability 
Ling Li and Perry Singleton, Syracuse University, The Center for Policy Research, 426 Eggers 
Hall, Syracuse, NY, 13244 
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I. Introduction 
Marriage is associated with better social, economic, and health outcomes, but the 
mechanism for these associations remains debatable.1  Some argue that the associations arise 
from marriage selection, whereby people with better outcomes are more likely to marry 
(Goldman 1993; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  This would occur if the gains from marriage 
increase with socioeconomic status or health (Becker 1973).  Others argue that the associations 
arise from marriage protection, whereby marriage has a causal impact on well-being (Waite and 
Gallagher 2000).  For example, marriage may alter health behaviors, expand social networks, or 
increase efficiency of household production.  The debate between selection and protection is 
directly relevant to public policy.   For example, since 2001, the US government spent 
approximately $800 million on the Healthy Marriage Initiative, a public program designed to 
promote marriage and discourage divorce.  The costs of such programs are justified, in part, by 
the gains from marriage protection. 
To contribute to the debate, this study examines the dynamic effect of disability on 
marriage.  According to Meyer and Mok (2013), approximately one-third of male heads-of-
household will be at least temporarily disabled before reaching age 50.  Additionally, recently 
disabled males are significantly less likely to be married than non-disabled males (Singleton 
2012).  The empirical question is whether marital status changes discretely at the time of 
disability onset, due to marriage formation, marriage dissolution, or both.  Such effects would 
highlight the importance of marriage selection, rather than marriage protection, in the oft-cited 
relationship between marriage and better health. 
                                                          
1 For example, married couples have higher wages (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Schoeni 
1995), lower rates of chronic conditions (Verbrugge 1979), and lower rates of mortality (Hu and 
Goldman 1990). 
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The dynamic effect of disability on marriage is estimated using an event-study model.  
The advantage of the model is its flexibility, allowing the effect of disability on marriage to 
change dynamically relative to the date of disability onset.  Estimation of the model requires 
longitudinal or retrospective data on disability and marriage.  The treatment group is composed 
of individuals who become disabled during the analysis period.  The marriage dynamics of the 
treatment group are compared to those of a comparison group, controlling for observable 
differences between the two groups.   
In this study, the treatment and comparison groups are derived from different surveys.  
For the treatment group, the study utilizes data from the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS).  The 
NBS was designed to characterized new beneficiaries of the Social Security Administration.  The 
treatment group is composed of new beneficiaries to the Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) program who became disabled in 1980.  The survey was conducted shortly thereafter, in 
late 1982.  The survey reports marital status at the time of the survey and the dates of marriage 
formation and dissolution for the most recent marriage. 
For the comparison group, the study utilizes data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP).  The SIPP provides longitudinal data for a representative sample 
the non-institutionalized, US population.  The data come specifically from topical module two of 
the 1986 SIPP, which reports retrospective information for marriage formation and dissolution 
for up to three marriages.  Rather than distinguishing between the disabled and non-disabled, or 
between SSDI beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the comparison group represents the entire 
non-institutional population, regardless of health or beneficiary status. 
The empirical analysis focuses on three marital outcomes: married, marriage formation, 
and marriage dissolution.  Marriage formation and marriage dissolution are conditioned on 
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being single and married, respectively, so the means of these variables can be interpreted as 
hazard rates.  The analysis period ranges from 1977 to 1982. 
The results suggest that disability decreased marriage among males and females, but only 
at younger ages.  In the year before disability onset, younger male beneficiaries were -8.12 
percentage points less likely to be married compared to SIPP males.  In just two years after 
disability onset, marriage among beneficiaries decreased by an additional 7.04 percentage points.  
The respective figures for younger females were -13.44 percentage points and 11.39 percentage 
points.  Thus, in just two years, disability onset is associated with a near doubling of the 
difference in marriage between SSDI beneficiaries and the SIPP population. 
The event-study model is then used to determine whether the decrease in marriage is due 
to marriage formation, marriage dissolution, or both.  This is accomplished by estimating the 
event-study model with marriage formation and marriage dissolution as outcome variables.  The 
results suggest that the decrease in marriage among younger male beneficiaries is due to both 
formation and dissolution, while the decrease in marriage among younger female beneficiaries is 
due only to formation.   
The event-study model is also used to examine whether the dynamic effect of disability 
on marriage differs by educational attainment and subsequent mortality.  Educational attainment 
is measure of socioeconomic status, and subsequent mortality is a measure of health severity.  
Among younger beneficiaries, disability onset had a similar effect on marriage regardless of 
educational attainment or subsequent mortality, but the mechanism for the decrease – formation 
versus dissolution – differs across groups.     
To control for observable differences between the treatment and comparison groups, the 
event-study model includes controls for age, race, and educational attainment.  When modeling 
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marriage dissolution, the model also includes controls for marriage tenure, as a measure of 
marriage quality.  In the final section of results, the model includes dynamic controls for types of 
health conditions, which are shown to vary by sex and age.  The substantive results are robust to 
these controls. 
The results contribute to an existing literature on the dynamic effects of disability on 
marriage.  Charles and Stephens (2002) focus on males using the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics.  They find no effect of disability on divorce.  Singleton (2012) focuses on both males 
and females using the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  He finds a positive effect of 
disability on divorce, but only among younger, more educated males.  Finally, Karraker and 
Latham (2015) focus on older males and females using the Health and Retirement Survey.  They 
find a positive effect of disability on divorce, but only among older females.  In contrast to these 
studies, this study finds a negative effect of disability on marriage among both males and 
females, but only at younger ages.  Additionally, this study finds a negative effect disability on 
marriage formation, while previous studies focus predominately on marriage dissolution. 
An important difference between this study and related studies is the data.  In related 
studies, the data come exclusively from representative surveys of the general population, and 
disability status is self-reported either longitudinally or retrospectively.  A disadvantage of 
survey data is that they contain relatively few spells of severe disability.  Another disadvantage is 
that disability is self-reported, raising concerns for endogeneity with respect to marital 
outcomes.2  The NBS, in contrast, is composed entirely of disability spells that limit, if not 
prevent, the ability to work.  Moreover, the veracity of the disability claim is corroborated by the 
                                                          
2 Bound (1991) discusses the endogeneity of self-reported health in models of retirement 
behavior. 
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Social Security Administration, which uses a sequential evaluation process to evaluate 
disabilities and award DI benefits.  An SSDI beneficiary must also have a sufficient work history 
to qualify for benefits.3 
The differences in data could increase or decrease the effect of disability on marriage in 
the NBS relative to survey data.4  On one hand, the effect of disability on marriage could be 
greater in the NBS, since it is limited to individuals with more severe disabilities and greater 
labor force attachment.  On the other hand, the effect could be smaller in the NBS, since receipt 
of SSDI benefits is presumably less endogenous than self-reported disability onset with 
respective to marital outcomes. 
The results from this study have direct implications for public policy.  Several public 
policies are designed to promote marriage, including marriage bonuses in the US income tax 
code, and the Healthy Marriage Initiative, which provides education and support services.  
However, it remains unclear whether such policies increase either the quantity or quality of 
marriage (Hawkins, Amato, Kinghorn 2013).  An alternative approach to promote marriage, 
supported by this study, is to reduce the incidence of disability onset, or to lessen the 
socioeconomic consequences of disability onset.  Such policies include expanding access to 
public health insurance or providing workplace accommodations for people with disabilities. 
 
II. Background 
A. Theory of Marriage Formation and Dissolution 
                                                          
3 In general, applicants must have worked at least five of the previous ten years to qualify for 
SSDI benefits. 
4 Despite the differences between survey data and the NBS, there is significant overlap between 
the most severely disabled in survey data and new receipt of SSDI benefits (Meyer and Mok, 
2013; Singleton 2014). 
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 A conceptual framework for health and marriage can be derived from economic theory.  
A theory of marriage, developed by Becker (1973), emphasizes the role of production within the 
household.  According to the model, households combine time and market goods to produce a 
single household commodity.  The commodity is transferable between individuals within the 
same household, but utility is derived at the individual level based on own consumption.  A 
person will enter a marriage only if it increases own consumption.  Thus, two persons will form a 
marriage only if production while married exceeds production while single.  In the marriage 
market, which is assumed to exist, individuals select partners to maximize own consumption, 
subject to market equilibrium constraints. 
 In equilibrium, individuals not only maximize own consumption, but the market 
maximizes production over all marriages.  This equilibrium condition has two implications for 
the sorting of individuals into marriage.  First, marriage should be more common among 
individuals who possess qualities that increase household production, for whom the value of 
marriage is greatest.  As Becker (1973) states, this may explain why more attractive and 
intelligent persons are more likely to marry.  Second, couples should sort positively into 
marriage based on attributes that are complementary in household production.  This may explain 
the positive sorting of couples with respect to intelligence, educational attainment, race, and 
health. 
 A theory of marriage dissolution, developed by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), is 
derived from Becker’s original the theory of marriage.  The theory has two implications for 
divorce.  First, if search costs are high, individuals are willing to form lower quality marriages, 
which are more susceptible to divorce.  Second, because marriage is dynamic, the decision to 
marry is based on expectations of marital quality.  However, expected marital quality may 
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deviate from realized marital quality, and these deviations – for better or for worse – may 
precipitate divorce. 
B. Role of Health and Marriage 
 The theories of marriage formation and dissolution have direct implications for the role 
of health.  According to the theory of marriage formation (Becker 1973), individuals are 
motivated to marry for the production of household commodities.  Thus, the effect of health on 
marriage is determined by its effect on household productivity.  If health increases productivity, 
then the prevalence of marriage should be greater among the healthy.  Additionally, if health 
between spouses is complementary in household production, then couples should sort positively 
in regards to health.  Health shocks may disrupt the propensity to form marriages, as individuals 
must recalibrate their search in the marriage market or may no longer find marriage optimal. 
 According to the theory of marriage dissolution (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977), 
divorce occurs when marital quality deviates sufficiently from prior expectations.  The effect of a 
health shock on expected marital quality depends on two factors (Singleton 2012).  The first is 
the incidence of health shocks, which reflects the extent to which shocks are anticipated.  
Unanticipated shocks should have a larger effect on expected marital quality than anticipated 
shocks.  The second factor is the direct effect of health shocks on marital quality.  Naturally, 
more severe shocks should have a greater effect on expected marital quality than less severe 
shocks.  Whether a health shock precipitates divorce ultimately depends on whether expected 
marital quality falls below the expected value of outside alternatives, which is more likely to 
occur among lower-quality marriages. 
 There are two additional considerations regarding the role of health in marriage.  First, 
the role of health may differ by whose health is affected.  According to Becker (1973), couples 
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should sort negatively with respect to market wage, which allows the higher wage spouse to 
specialize in market work and the lower wage spouse to specialize in household production.  
Thus, the effect of health on marriage depends on whether health affects household productivity, 
market productivity, or both, and on whether the affected spouse specializes in market work or 
household production.  For these reasons, “work-preventing” disabilities, as reported in survey 
data, may have a greater impact on divorce among primary earners.  
 Second, while health may be an important input in household production, it may also be 
an output.  For example, household production may include healthier meals, which in turn 
improves health.  Stated above, the healthy are not only more likely to marry, but are more likely 
to marry others who are healthy, assuming health is complementary in household production.  If 
so, then healthy couples are the most efficient at producing better health, which increases 
subsequent marital quality.  Thus, marriages with high initial quality and long tenure may be the 
most robust, due in part to household production over the course of the marriage (Lillard and 
Waite 1995).  This also implies that marriages with high initial quality and short marriage tenure 
may be the most fragile, since marriage is predicated on future household production, which may 
not be realized following an adverse health shock. 
C. Empirical Evidence on Health and Marriage 
 Numerous studies find a positive association between marriage and health, including 
lower rates of long-term disability, health conditions, and mortality.5  This association reflects 
two possible mechanisms.  The first is marriage selection, whereby healthy individuals are more 
                                                          
5 For example, Verbrugge (1979) finds that rates of chronic conditions and long-term disability 
are lowest among the married and greatest among the widowed, divorced, and separated.  And 
Hu and Goldman (1990) find that rates of mortality are lower among the married than the non-
married. 
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likely to marry than the less healthy.  According to the theories of marriage, selection may occur 
for several reasons: search costs may be lower for the healthy, leading to more, higher quality 
marriages; the net value of marriage may be greater for the healthy, who are more efficient at 
household production; and health shocks may precipitate divorce, particularly if the shocks are 
severe and unanticipated.  Selection may also arise if couples sort by characteristics associated 
with health, such as intelligence, attractiveness, and labor market productivity (Goldman 1993).  
The second mechanism is marriage protection, whereby marriage has a causal impact on health.  
This may be due to greater efficiency in household production, better management of health 
behaviors, and increased social integration.   
 In the empirical literature, studies attempt to provide direct evidence for either marriage 
selection or marriage protection.  To identify protection, two recent studies examine how marital 
transitions affect mortality using longitudinal data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics: 
Zick and Smith (1991) and Lillard and Waite (1995).  Although both studies find an association 
between marriage and mortality, these associations may be confounded with marriage selection.  
A more direct approach, by Umberson (1992), is to examine how marital transitions affect health 
behaviors.  She finds that marriage formation has no effect on health behaviors, but marriage 
dissolution increases negative health behaviors, particularly among men. 
 To identify selection, several studies estimate the effect of health on marital transitions.  
For example, Smith and Smith (2010) examine how psychological problems as a child affect 
marriage as an adult.  They find that psychological problems decreased the likelihood of 
marriage by 11 percentage points.  Other studies examine how contemporaneous health shocks – 
namely, disability onset – affect marriage using longitudinal or retrospective data.  Charles and 
Stephens (2002), using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, find that disability onset among 
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males had no effect divorce.  In contrast, Singleton (2012), using the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation, finds that disability onset increased divorce, particularly among younger, 
more educated males.  Finally, Karraker and Latham (2015), using the Health and Retirement 
Survey, find that disability onset among females increased divorce, and disability onset among 
either spouse increased widowhood.  In contrast to Charles and Stephens (2002) and Singleton 
(2012), Karraker and Latham (2015) focus only on older couples. 
 
III. Methodology 
The empirical objective is to measure the dynamic effect of disability on marriage.  The 
study uses an event-study model similar to Charles and Stephens (2002), Meyer and Mok (2013), 
and Singleton (2012).  The advantage of the event-study model is its flexibility, allowing marital 
outcomes to change non-parametrically relative to the date of disability onset.  Estimation of the 
model requires longitudinal or retrospective data on marriage and disability onset.  The data are 
divided into two groups: a treatment group, composed of individuals who become disabled 
during the analysis period, and an appropriate comparison group.  The empirical question is 
whether marital status changes discretely at the time of disability onset. 
 In regression form, the event-study model is defined as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏≠−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
The outcome variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of marital status, where the subscript 𝑖𝑖 indexes individuals 
and the subscript 𝑡𝑡 indexes calendar years.  The variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a disability group indicator, 
equaling one if individual 𝑖𝑖 belongs to the disabled group and zero otherwise.  The variables 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  
are disability-by-period indicators.  Periods are measured in calendar years, with period 0 as the 
year of disability onset.  For example, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0  is a disability group indicator in period 0, equaling one 
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if individual 𝑖𝑖 becomes disabled in calendar year 𝑡𝑡 and zero otherwise.  The left-out period for 
the disability-by-period indicators is -1, the calendar year before disability onset.  The 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 measures the difference in 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 between the disabled and comparison groups in 
period -1, and the coefficient 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏 measures the differential change in 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 between the treatment 
and comparison group from period -1 to period 𝜏𝜏.  
 When modeling the likelihood of marriage, the outcome variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator of 
marriage, equaling one if individual 𝑖𝑖 in calendar year 𝑡𝑡 is married and zero otherwise.  In this 
case, coefficient 𝛽𝛽 measures the difference in the likelihood of marriage between the treatment 
and comparison group in period -1, and the 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏 measures the differential change in the likelihood 
of marriage from period -1 to period 𝜏𝜏.  If disability onset decreases the likelihood of marriage – 
by decreasing formation, increasing dissolution, or both – then the coefficients 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏 should be 
negative in periods 0 onwards.  The immediate effect of disability onset on marriage is measured 
by the coefficient 𝛾𝛾0. 
 The model also includes a vector of control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  The vector accounts for 
observable differences between the treatment and comparison groups that directly affect the 
likelihood of marriage.  According to related studies, disability onset is more common among the 
aged, non-white, and less educated (Singleton 2012).  Thus, the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes age, aged 
squared, an indicator for race (white, with non-white as the left-out group), and indicators for 
educational attainment (less than a high school diploma and any education beyond high school, 
with high school diploma only as the left-out group).  Because the age profile of marriage may 
differ by race and educational attainment, the model also includes interactions of age and age 
squared with the indicators of race and educational attainment. 
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 Because the outcome variable is dichotomous, the residual term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is necessarily 
heteroscedastic.  Thus, the standard errors of the model are calculated using the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator. 
 
IV. Data 
A. Treatment Group: New Beneficiary Survey  
Data for the treatment group come from the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS).  The NBS 
was commissioned by the US Social Security Administration (SSA) to characterize new SSA 
beneficiaries.  To derive the sample, individuals were randomly selected from the Master 
Beneficiary Record (MBR), which contains an administrative record of all retired and disabled 
worker beneficiaries.  To characterize new beneficiaries, the sampling frame was restricted to 
individuals who received their first benefit payment from mid-1980 to mid-1981, and the survey 
was conducted shortly thereafter, from October to December of 1982.  The NBS comprises both 
survey data and SSA administrative data, merged at the individual level. 
Using the NBS, the treatment group is defined as disabled worker beneficiaries newly 
entitled to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits.  By design, disabled worker 
beneficiaries received their first DI payment from July 1980 to June 1981.  To reduce sampling 
error by sex, males and females were sampled from separate strata.  The date of disability onset 
is reported in the MBR.  The date of onset is self-reported by the beneficiary at the time of 
benefit application.  The timing of marriage is reported in the survey.  The data report the year of 
marriage, separation, divorce, and widowhood.  The analysis focuses only on the most recent 
marriage, as data on previous marriages are not generally available. 
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Initially, the NBS initially contains 5,198 DI beneficiaries: 3,594 male beneficiaries and 
1,605 female beneficiaries.  Three restrictions are imposed to derive the treatment group.  First, 
the sample is restricted to ages 20 to 59, eliminating 34.7 percent of the sample (34.45 percent of 
are aged 60 and above).   Second, the sample is restricted to beneficiaries whose disability onset 
occurs in 1980, eliminating 4.8 percent of the remaining sample.  Third, the sample is restricted 
to beneficiaries who have complete information on marriage formation and dissolution, 
eliminating 2.0 percent of the remaining sample.  After these restrictions, the treatment group 
contains 3,155 beneficiaries: 2,162 male beneficiaries and 993 female beneficiaries. 
B. Comparison Group: Survey of Income and Program Participation 
 Data for the comparison group come from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP).  The SIPP provides longitudinal data for a representative sample of the non-
institutionalized, US population.  The data come specifically from topical module two of the 
1986 SIPP, which was designed to collect retrospective data on marriage formation and 
dissolution.  For up to three marriages, the data report the year of marriage, separation, divorce, 
and widowhood.  
To derive the comparison group, two restrictions are imposed on the sample.  First, the 
sample is restricted to ages 24 to 63 in 1986.  These ages are comparable to those of the 
treatment group, which was restricted to ages 20 to 59 in 1982.  Second, the sample is restricted 
to individuals who had fewer than four marriages, as data on the fourth marriage and beyond are 
not available.  This restriction eliminates just 0.52 percent of the remaining sample.  After these 
two restrictions, the comparison group contains 11,431 respondents: 5,432 male respondents and 
5,999 female respondents. 
C. Outcome Variables 
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 Using retrospective data on marriage, the empirical analysis focuses on three binary 
outcomes: married, marriage formation, and marriage dissolution.  The first variable, married, 
indicates marital status at the end of a calendar year.  The variable equals one if married and zero 
otherwise.  The second variable, marriage formation, indicates whether a marriage forms during 
the calendar year, conditional on not being married at the end of the preceding calendar year.  
The variable equals one if marriage forms during the calendar year and zero otherwise.  The third 
variable, marriage dissolution, indicates whether a marriage ends during the calendar year, 
conditional on being married at any time during the calendar year.  The variable reflects 
separation or divorce, but not widowhood.  Because marriage formation and marriage 
dissolution are conditioned on being single and married, respectively, the means of these 
variables can be interpreted as hazard rates.  All three variables are constructed annually from 
1977 to 1982.   
 
V. Summary Statistics 
A. Demographic Characteristics 
Table 1 reports demographic characteristics by sex and survey.  The characteristics are 
measured at the time of the survey, which was 1982 for the NBS and 1986 for the SIPP.  In 
comparison to the SIPP, new SSDI beneficiaries are more likely to be older, non-white, and less 
educated.  After adjusting for the year of the survey, SSDI beneficiaries are approximately 15 
years older than individuals in the SIPP.  New beneficiaries are also less likely to be married.  
The difference in marriage is larger among females, due to greater rates of separation, divorce, 
and widowhood among female beneficiaries.  The event-study model will determine whether the 
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differences in marriage between the treatment are systematically related to disability onset, 
controlling for observable differences between the two groups. 
Demographic characteristics also differ between female and male beneficiaries within the 
NBS.  In regards to education, female beneficiaries are more likely to have at least a high school 
diploma.  This may reflect the work requirements necessary for SSDI eligibility, whereby only 
the most educated females have the work history to qualify.  In regards to marital status, female 
beneficiaries are less likely to be married than male beneficiaries.  Again, the difference in 
marriage is due to greater rates of separation, divorce, and widowhood among female 
beneficiaries. 
B. Dynamics of Marriage 
 Before estimating the event-study model, the dynamics of marriage are first examined 
graphically.  The percent married is illustrated separately for males and females in Figures 1 and 
2, respectively.  Each figure consists of three panels: panel A utilizes the full sample, ages 20 to 
59; panel B is limited to younger ages, 20 to 44; and Panel C is limited to older ages, 45 to 59.  
Within each panel, the percent married is plotted separately by survey and period year.  By 
construction, period year zero corresponds to calendar year 1980, the year of disability onset 
among new SSDI beneficiaries. 
 As shown in panels A, disability onset appears to have altered trends in marriage among 
new SSDI beneficiaries.  Among male beneficiaries, marriage increased before disability onset, 
but plateaued at approximately 70.5 percent after disability onset.  In contrast, marriage 
increased throughout the analysis period among SIPP males.  Marriage trended similarly for both 
groups before period zero, though SIPP males were less likely to be married than male 
beneficiaries. 
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 A break in trend is also evident among female beneficiaries.  As shown, marriage 
decreased before disability onset, but decreased more after disability onset.  In contrast, marriage 
increased throughout the analysis period among SIPP females. 
According to Table 1, SSDI beneficiaries are substantially older than individuals in the 
SIPP, which could affect both the levels and trends of marriage.  To control for age, marriage is 
plotted separately at younger and older ages, illustrated in panels B and C, respectively.  
Controlling for sex and age yields two notable patterns.  First, both survey groups exhibit similar 
trends in marriage before period zero.  This is evident for both males and females at younger and 
older ages.  This suggests that the trend in marriage observed in the SIPP is a reasonable 
counterfactual for the trend among SSDI beneficiaries in the absence of disability onset.  Second, 
disability onset affected the trend in marriage among younger beneficiaries, but not older 
beneficiaries.  Among younger male beneficiaries, marriage increased before disability onset, 
then plateaued at approximately 49 percent after disability onset.  Among younger female 
beneficiaries, marriage increased before disability onset, then decreased after disability onset, 
peaking at approximately 48 percent. 
The dynamics of disability and marriage observed in Figures 1 and 2 are estimated using 
the event-study model.  The model is estimated separately by sex, which accounts for the 
differential trends in marriage between males and females.  Additionally, the model will include 
two sets of disability-by-period indicators: one corresponding to younger beneficiaries, ages 20 
to 44, and the other corresponding to older beneficiaries, ages 45 to 59.  This allows for 
differential effects of disability by age.  To control for fixed effects by calendar year, the model 
includes indicator variables for each period year, with -1 as the left-out year.  In all estimations, 
the analysis period ranges from -3 to 2, as in Figures 1 and 2.   
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VI. Results 
A. Married 
 First, the event-study model is estimated with married as the outcome variable.  The 
results are presented in panel A of Tables 2 and 3, corresponding to males and females, 
respectively.  Each panel consists of two columns.  Column one corresponds to younger 
beneficiaries; column two corresponds to older beneficiaries.  The first estimate in each column 
is of 𝛽𝛽, the coefficient associated with the main disability indicator 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖.  This estimate measures 
the difference in marriage between the NBS and the SIPP in period -1, the left-out period.  The 
remaining estimates measure the differential change in marriage before and after disability onset.  
All estimates are factored by 100 and thus interpreted as percentage points. 
 The results confirm that disability onset is associated with a decrease in marriage, 
particularly among younger beneficiaries.  The results for younger male beneficiaries are 
presented in column one, panel A of Table 2.  In period -1, younger male beneficiaries were 8.12 
percentage less likely to be married than SIPP males.  This difference is relatively stable before 
disability onset, as indicated by the small and statistically insignificant estimates of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  in periods 
-3 and -2.  However, the difference increases substantially after disability onset, as indicated by 
the large, negative estimates for 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  in periods 0 and beyond.  By period 2, the difference in 
marriage increased by 7.04 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  Thus, in less than three years after disability onset, the difference in marriage nearly 
doubled, from 8.12 percentage points in period -1 to 15.16 percentage points in period 2. 
The results for younger female beneficiaries are presented in column one, panel A of 
Table 3.  In period -1, younger female beneficiaries were 13.44 percentage points less likely to 
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be married relative to SIPP females.  The difference is relatively stable before disability onset, 
but increases substantially after disability onset.  By period 2, the difference in marriage 
increased by 11.39 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
Thus, in less than three years after disability onset, the difference in marriage nearly doubled, 
from 13.44 percentage points in period -1 to 24.84 percentage points in period 2. 
In contrast to younger beneficiaries, there is no systematic relationship between disability 
onset and marriage among older beneficiaries.  The results for older male beneficiaries are 
presented in column one, panel A of Table 2.  In period -1, older male beneficiaries were 2.18 
percentage points less likely to be married than SIPP males.  This difference is larger before 
disability onset and smaller after disability onset, indicating an upward trend in marriage 
throughout the analysis period.  The results for older male beneficiaries are presented in column 
one, panel A of Table 3.  In period -1, older female beneficiaries were 15.85 percentage points 
less likely to married than SIPP females.  This difference appears stable both before and after 
disability onset.   
The upward trend in marriage among older male beneficiaries is not systematically 
related to disability onset.  Instead, the trend may be attributable to differences in marriage data 
between the NBS and the SIPP.  The SIPP reports data for up to three marriages, but the NBS 
reports data only for the most recent marriage.  This would lead to lower rates of marriage 
among the NBS relative to the SIPP, with the difference increasing with the years before the 
survey.  To explore this possibility, the model for males is re-estimated with marriage in the 
SIPP defined only for the most recent marriage.  With this specification, the estimates of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  for 
older male beneficiaries are small and statistically insignificant.  This suggests that the upward 
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trend in marriage among older male beneficiaries is attributable to the lack of marriage data in 
the NBS. 
B. Marriage Formation and Dissolution 
 Disability onset is associated with a decrease in marriage, particularly among younger 
beneficiaries.  An important question is whether the decrease in marriage is due to marriage 
formation, marriage dissolution, or both.  To address this question, the event-study model is re-
estimated separately with marriage formation and dissolution as outcome variables.  Because 
these variables are defined only for the non-married and married, respectively, the sample size 
decreases for each model. 
 The results are presented in panels B and C of Tables 2 and 3.  Panel B presents results 
for marriage formation, and panel C presents results for marriage dissolution.  As shown in 
Table 2, the decrease in marriage among younger male beneficiaries is due to both marriage 
formation and dissolution.  For example, in period 0, the rate of marriage formation decreased by 
5.78 percentage points, relative to a baseline difference in period -1 of -0.95 percentage points.  
Additionally, the rate of marriage dissolution increased by 3.49 percentage points, relative to a 
baseline difference of 0.64 percentage points.  In contrast to younger male beneficiaries, the table 
reveals no statistically significant change in marriage formation or dissolution among older male 
beneficiaries. 
 As shown in Table 3, the decrease in marriage among younger female beneficiaries is 
also due to both marriage formation and dissolution, but the effects on formation are larger and 
statistically significant.  For example, in period 2, the rate of marriage formation decreased by 
6.93 percentage points, relative to a baseline difference of -0.97 percentage points.  The rate of 
marriage dissolution increased by 4.83 percentage points, relative to a baseline difference of 2.85 
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percentage points.  The table also reveals a decrease in marriage formation among older female 
beneficiaries.  By period 2, the rate of marriage formation decreased by 3.96 percentage points, 
relative to a baseline difference of 2.11 percentage points.  However, the decrease in marriage 
formation among older female beneficiaries did not affect rates of marriage, as shown in column 
two of panel A. 
C. Educational Attainment 
  According to economic theories of marriage, the association between disability onset and 
marriage should be greater at higher levels of socioeconomic status.  This because the incidence 
of disability is lower at higher levels of socioeconomic status and because the expectations of 
marital quality presumably increase with socioeconomic status.  To explore this theoretical 
prediction, the event-study model is re-estimated with four sets of disability-by-period indicators, 
which differ by both age and educational attainment.  Lower education is defined as no high 
school diploma, and higher education is defined as a high school diploma or more. 
 Table 4 presents the results for males, and Table 5 presents the result for females.  Each 
table consists of three panels, corresponding with the three different outcome variables.  Each 
panel consists of four columns, corresponding to the four categories of age and educational 
attainment. 
 According to panel A of Table 4, disability onset is associated with a decrease in 
marriage among younger male beneficiaries, regardless of educational attainment.  By period 2, 
marriage decreased by 6.89 percentage points among younger, lower educated males, and by 
7.11 percentage points among younger, higher educated males.  However, only the latter 
estimate is statistically significant. 
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Although marriage decreases among younger male beneficiaries, regardless of 
educational attainment, the mechanism for the decrease differs between the two groups.  This is 
shown in panels B and C.  Among younger, lower educated males, the decrease in marriage is 
due to both formation and dissolution.  In regards to dissolution, the rate decreased temporarily 
in the year preceding disability onset, only to increase more after disability onset.  This is evident 
in column one of panel C, where the main disability effect is -2.09 percentage points, and all the 
disability-by-period effects are positive and statistically significant.  Among younger, more 
educated males, the decrease in marriage is due only to formation.  In period 0, the rate of 
marriage formation decreased by 7.50 percentage points, relative to a baseline difference of -1.20 
percentage points. 
The results for females are presented in Table 5.  As shown, disability onset is associated 
with a decrease in marriage among younger female beneficiaries, regardless of educational 
attainment.  By period 2, marriage decreased 11.95 percentage points among younger, less 
educated females, and by 11.22 percentage points among younger, more educated females.   
Although marriage decreases for younger female beneficiaries, regardless of educational 
attainment, the baseline difference in marriage differs between the two groups.  Among younger, 
less educated females, the difference in marriage is small and statistically insignificant. 
However, among younger, more educated females, the difference in marriage is -16.8 percentage 
points.  These results suggest that marriage selection occurs before disability onset among 
younger, more educated females, whereas no such selection is evident among younger, less 
educated females. 
Moreover, the mechanism for the decrease in marriage after disability onset also differs 
between the two groups.  Among younger, less educated females, the decrease in marriage is due 
22 
 
predominately to marriage dissolution.  By period year 2, the rate of marriage dissolution 
increased by 13.07 percentage points, relative to a baseline difference of -0.37 percentage points.  
Among younger, more educated beneficiaries, the decrease in marriage is due predominately to 
marriage formation.  By period 2, the rate of marriage formation decreased by 7.46 percentage 
points, relative to a baseline difference of -1.55 percentage points. 
D. Mortality 
 Several studies document an association between marital status and mortality.  Thus, an 
important question is whether the dynamic association between disability onset and marriage 
differs by subsequent mortality.  To address this question, the analysis utilizes administrative 
data on mortality available in the NBS.  Using these data, the event-study model is re-estimated 
with four sets of disability-by-period indicators, which differ by age and subsequent mortality.  
Subsequent mortality is measured as being deceased by 1990.   
 Table 6 presents the results for males, and Table 7 presents the result for females.  
According to panel A of Table 6, disability onset is associated with a decrease in marriage 
among younger male beneficiaries, regardless of subsequent mortality.  By period 2, marriage 
decreased by -9.77 percentage points among males who were deceased by 1990, and by 6.61 
percentage points among those who were not deceased by 1990.  However, the mechanism for 
the decrease in marriage differs between the two groups.  While both groups exhibit a decrease 
in marriage formation, only those who were deceased by 1990 exhibited an increase in marriage 
dissolution, particularly in period 0.  In that period, the rate of marriage dissolution increased by 
11.16 percentage, relative to baseline difference of -0.13 percentage points.   
According to panel A of Table 7, disability onset is associated with a decrease in 
marriage among younger female beneficiaries, regardless of subsequent mortality.  By period 2, 
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marriage decreased by 17.91 percentage points among those who were deceased by 1990, and by 
10.53 percentage points among those who were not.  However, the mechanism for the decrease 
in marriage differs between the two groups.  While both groups exhibit a decrease in marriage 
formation, only those who were deceased by 1990 exhibited an increase in marriage dissolution, 
though the effects are not statistically significant.  For example, in period 1, the rate of marriage 
dissolution increased by 7.45 percentage, relative to baseline difference of -2.10 percentage 
points.   
The two groups also exhibit different trends in marriage before disability onset.  Among 
females who were not deceased by 1990, marriage was relatively stable before disability onset.  
However, among females who were deceased by 1990, marriage increased substantially relative 
to SIPP females.  In fact, by period -1, these beneficiaries were 15.03 percentage points more 
likely to married than females in the SIPP.  The mechanism for the increase in marriage is 
evident in panels B and C.  As shown, female beneficiaries who were deceased by 1990 were 
significantly more likely to form marriages before disability onset than SIPP females, and the 
rate of marriage formation increased closer to the date of disability onset.  By period -1, the rate 
of marriage formation was 18.18 percentage points greater among younger female beneficiaries 
who were deceased by 1990. 
E. Health Conditions 
 According to the baseline results, disability onset is associated with a decrease in 
marriage, particularly among younger beneficiaries.  These results are consistent with economic 
theory, because the incidence of disability is lower among the young, and because the effect of 
disability on marital quality is presumably larger among the young.  However, an alternative 
interpretation is that disabilities differ between the young and old, and these differences account 
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for the dynamic effect of disability onset marriage.  For this interpretation to be plausible, the 
young must experience more debilitating disabilities, despite a lower incidence of disability 
onset.   
 To address this possible interpretation, the baseline model is estimated using controls for 
health conditions reported in the NBS.  Unfortunately, the NBS does not report the precise cause 
of disability onset.  Instead, the data report whether participants have specific health conditions 
posed by the survey.  Survey participants may respond affirmatively to any and all conditions.  
The data report information on 14 health conditions, which are then aggregated to eight. 
Summary statistics of health conditions are reported in Table 8.  The table reports rates 
of the eight health conditions, and enumerates the initial 14 health conditions reported in the 
survey.  Response rates are reported separately by sex and age.  In general, older beneficiaries 
are more likely to report specific health conditions than younger beneficiaries.  The two 
exceptions are the nervous system, which includes multiple sclerosis and cerebral palsy, and 
mental illness, defined as a nervous or emotional problem.  The different rates of these 
conditions by age are statistically significant among both males and females. 
An empirical question is whether the dynamic effect of disability on marriage, measured 
in Tables 2 and 3, are robust to controls for health conditions.  To address this question, the 
event-study model includes eight sets of disability-by-period indicators.  The eight sets 
correspond to the conditions in Table 8.  With these additional control variables, the event-study 
model measures the dynamic association between disability and marriage separately for younger 
and older beneficiaries, controlling dynamically for health conditions that may differ between the 
two groups.   
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The results for males are presented in Table 9, and the results for females are presented 
in Table 10.  As shown, the baseline results in Tables 2 and 3 are generally robust to dynamic 
controls for health conditions.  In Table 9, disability onset decreases marriage among younger 
male beneficiaries, and the decrease is due to both marriage formation and dissolution.  
However, only the estimate for marriage formation is statistically significant, in contrast to 
Tables 2.  In Table 10, disability onset decreases marriage among younger female beneficiaries, 
and this decrease is due predominately to marriage formation.  These results are consistent with 
the baseline results reported in Table 3.  Although the baseline results are robust to dynamic 
controls for health conditions, these controls do not substantially improve the explanatory power 
of the model.  This is evident by the similar measures of R-square between Tables 2 and 9 and 
between Tables 3 and 10. 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
 This study examines the dynamic effect of disability on marriage.  Data for the treatment 
come from the NBS, designed to characterize new beneficiaries to the SSDI program.  The 
results suggest that disability onset decreases the likelihood of marriage, particularly among 
younger beneficiaries.  The decrease in marriage reflects both a decrease in marriage formation 
and an increase in marriage dissolution. 
 The study contributes to an existing literature on dynamic effect of disability on marriage.  
Studies in this literature use longitudinal or retrospective survey data on disability and marriage, 
and disability onset is measured by self-report.  These studies find either no effect of disability 
on divorce, or only limited effects among younger, educated males.  No study finds effect of 
disability on marriage formation.  Using novel data from the NBS, this study finds substantial 
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effects of disability on marriage, marriage formation, and marriage dissolution.  The difference 
in findings may reflect that the NBS is limited individuals with the more severe disabilities and 
greater attachment to the labor force. 
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A. Ages 20 to 59 
 
B. Ages 20 to 44 
 
C. Ages 45 to 59 
Figure 1 
Percent Married by Period Year: Males Ages 20 to 59 
 
The data come from the New Beneficiary Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
The New Beneficiary Survey is limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program.  By construction, new beneficiaries became disabled in period 0.   
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A. Ages 20 to 59 
 
B. Ages 20 to 44 
 
C. Ages 45 to 59 
Figure 2 
Percent Married by Period Year: Females Ages 20 to 59 
 
The data come from the New Beneficiary Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
The New Beneficiary Survey is limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program.  By construction, new beneficiaries became disabled in period 0.   
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Table 1      
Summary Statistics by Sex and Survey 
 Males  Females 
Survey NBS SIPP   NBS SIPP 
Age (years) 47.69 36.36  47.91 36.93 
 (0.23) (0.16)  (0.34) (0.15) 
White 80.90 89.65  76.94 87.30 
 (0.85) (0.41)  (1.34) (0.43) 
Less than HS 53.65 19.48  45.02 19.12 
 (1.07) (0.54)  (1.58) (0.51) 
HS only 30.30 42.34  33.53 48.89 
 (0.99) (0.67)  (1.50) (0.65) 
More than HS 16.05 38.18  21.45 31.99 
 (0.79) (0.66)  (1.30) (0.60) 
Married 70.58 72.77  49.55 69.73 
 (0.98) (0.60)  (1.59) (0.59) 
Widowed 2.08 0.85  11.18 4.65 
 (0.31) (0.12)  (1.00) (0.27) 
Separated 3.70 2.28  8.56 3.25 
 (0.41) (0.20)  (0.89) (0.23) 
Divorced 9.90 8.23  18.03 10.52 
 (0.64) (0.37)  (1.22) (0.40) 
Single 13.74 15.87  12.69 11.85 
 (0.74) (0.50)  (1.06) (0.42) 
      
Observations 2,162 5,432   993 5,999 
The data come from the New Beneficiary Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
The New Beneficiary Survey is limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program.  All estimates are in percent, unless otherwise noted.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2         
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age: Males Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married    B. Formation   C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -8.12 -2.18  -0.95 1.18  0.64 0.11 
 (1.83)* (1.20)  (1.53) (1.59)  (0.90) (0.36) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -1.80 -3.58  -1.76 -1.77  1.55 0.21 
 (2.51) (1.62)*  (1.94) (1.95)  (1.42) (0.50) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -1.03 -1.43  -0.68 1.16  -0.19 0.22 
 (2.53) (1.61)  (2.03) (2.13)  (1.18) (0.47) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -3.69 -0.09  -5.78 -3.11  3.49 0.37 
 (2.59) (1.63)  (1.96)* (1.96)  (1.54)* (0.50) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -5.26 0.45  -4.77 -0.58  1.02 0.05 
 (2.60)* (1.64)  (1.99)* (2.06)  (1.35) (0.51) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -7.04 0.94  -2.86 -1.72  3.08 -0.02 
 (2.61)* (1.65)  (2.18) (1.99)  (1.49)* (0.48) 
         
Observations 45,564  17,099  29,802 
R-Square 0.27   0.02   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital 
outcomes.  The treatment group is derived from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries 
of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is derived from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in 
marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome 
variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
Table 3         
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age: Females Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married    B. Formation   C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -13.44 -15.85  -0.97 2.11  2.85 1.04 
 (2.82)* (1.99)*  (2.21) (1.28)  (1.81) (0.69) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -0.66 -0.64  0.51 -0.94  -1.96 -0.56 
 (3.97) (2.73)  (3.01) (1.62)  (2.32) (0.88) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -0.22 -0.79  -0.17 0.28  -1.84 0.54 
 (3.99) (2.73)  (3.04) (1.75)  (2.36) (1.04) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -3.32 -0.08  -4.00 -1.38  1.65 0.69 
 (3.97) (2.75)  (2.84) (1.65)  (2.70) (1.01) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -6.25 -0.67  -4.51 -2.08  1.81 0.71 
 (3.97) (2.76)  (2.74) (1.53)  (2.76) (1.03) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -11.39 -1.66  -6.93 -3.96  4.83 1.33 
 (3.96)* (2.78)  (2.61)* (1.43)*  (3.09) (1.12) 
         
Observations 41,952  16,091  27,076 
R-Square 0.18   0.03   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital 
outcomes.  The treatment group is derived from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries 
of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is derived from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in 
marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome 
variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
 
Table 4               
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age and Education: Males Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married  B. Formation  C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59 
Education Low High Low High   Low High Low High   Low High Low High 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -5.64 -9.35 -1.70 -2.44  -0.47 -1.20 0.59 0.29  -2.09 2.35 0.29 -0.17 
 (3.02) (2.23)* (1.62) (1.61)  (2.38) (1.91) (1.68) (0.48)  (0.33)* (1.40) (0.48) (0.46) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -2.25 -1.54 -2.84 -4.62  -1.74 -1.77 -2.42 0.17  4.22 -0.11 0.17 0.27 
 (4.13) (3.04) (2.07) (2.22)*  (3.01) (2.39) (1.94) (0.64)  (1.76)* (1.99) (0.64) (0.63) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -2.82 0.07 -0.99 -2.05  -3.18 0.75 1.99 0.13  3.74 -2.67 0.13 0.35 
 (4.14) (3.08) (2.06) (2.21)  (2.85) (2.61) (2.37) (0.60)  (1.59)* (1.59) (0.60) (0.60) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -2.12 -4.65 0.03 -0.33  -2.81 -7.50 -2.03 -0.34  6.07 1.88 -0.34 1.38 
 (4.19) (3.18) (2.07) (2.25)  (3.21) (2.30)* (2.19) (0.58)  (1.98)* (2.15) (0.58) (0.77) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -4.43 -5.77 0.09 0.88  -5.90 -4.11 -0.41 -0.19  3.9 -0.79 -0.19 0.37 
 (4.18) (3.19) (2.09) (2.26)  (2.73)* (2.55) (2.25) (0.64)  (1.66)* (1.88) (0.64) (0.66) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -6.89 -7.11 0.17 1.96  -1.86 -3.45 -1.78 -0.35  7.61 0.23 -0.35 0.44 
 (4.20) (3.21)* (2.11) (2.27)  (3.29) (2.69) (2.15) (0.59)  (2.21)* (1.96) (0.59) (0.63) 
               
Observations 45,564  17,099  29,802 
R-Square 0.27   0.02   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital outcomes.  The treatment group is derived 
from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is 
derived from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  Low education is defined as less than a high school diploma.  The coefficient on 
the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel 
B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator 
of marriage dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the five percent level. 
 
Table 5               
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age and Education: Females Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married  B. Formation  C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59 
Education Low High Low High   Low High Low High   Low High Low High 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -0.57 -16.8 -11.33 -19.83  2.03 -1.55 1.52 2.87  -0.37 3.99 1.69 0.26 
 (5.78) (3.17)* (2.62)* (2.93)*  (5.17) (2.42) (1.37) (2.04)  (2.43) (2.28) (1.04) (0.80) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -0.85 -0.62 2.00 -3.87  0.16 0.58 2.18 -4.13  -2.19 -1.79 -1.23 0.33 
 (8.02) (4.48) (3.52) (4.08)  (7.12) (3.28) (2.04) (2.23)  (2.43) (3.02) (1.25) (1.13) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -1.22 0.04 1.24 -3.29  0.54 -0.29 1.63 -1.12  2.40 -3.36 0.14 1.06 
 (8.18) (4.49) (3.53) (4.08)  (7.50) (3.28) (2.01) (2.67)  (4.20) (2.80) (1.47) (1.35) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -4.10 -3.11 -1.09 1.14  0.40 -4.84 -1.97 -0.66  7.58 -0.49 0.15 1.40 
 (8.12) (4.47) (3.56) (4.09)  (7.48) (3.01) (1.57) (2.77)  (5.18) (3.13) (1.41) (1.35) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -3.19 -7.06 -2.90 2.04  3.86 -6.24 -1.87 -2.34  2.78 1.51 0.68 0.80 
 (8.14) (4.45) (3.57) (4.10)  (7.81) (2.81)* (1.57) (2.44)  (4.22) (3.41) (1.50) (1.26) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -11.95 -11.22 -3.97 1.12  -4.09 -7.46 -3.08 -5.10  13.07 1.77 0.38 2.57 
 (8.24) (4.43)* (3.60) (4.13)  (6.38) (2.80)* (1.56)* (2.10)*  (6.22)* (3.50) (1.49) (1.62) 
               
Observations 41,952  16,091  27,076 
R-Square 0.18   0.03   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital outcomes.  The treatment group is derived 
from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is 
derived from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  Low education is defined as less than a high school diploma.  The coefficient on 
the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel 
B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator 
of marriage dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the five percent level. 
 
Table 6               
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age and Mortality: Males Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married  B. Formation  C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59 
Deceased by 1990 Yes No Yes No   Yes No Yes No   Yes No Yes No 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -5.83 -8.44 -6.11 -0.40  1.03 -1.18 -0.05 1.89  -0.13 0.78 1.18 -0.36 
 (4.72) (1.95)* (2.01)* (1.34)  (4.49) (1.60) (2.02) (2.04)  (1.89) (0.99) (0.76) (0.34) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -6.09 -1.14 -2.95 -3.84  -2.54 -1.68 -2.43 -1.32  -1.46 2.02 -1.01 0.76 
 (6.50) (2.68) (2.79) (1.84)*  (5.62) (2.03) (2.35) (2.68)  (1.90) (1.61) (0.91) (0.53) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -1.93 -0.89 -0.52 -1.84  3.84 -1.36 2.52 0.32  0.69 -0.35 -0.77 0.66 
 (6.61) (2.70) (2.77) (1.83)  (6.57) (2.07) (3.00) (2.78)  (2.75) (1.29) (0.90) (0.48) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -5.70 -3.38 -0.53 0.10  -1.29 -6.36 -2.36 -3.59  11.16 2.06 -0.13 0.60 
 (6.86) (2.76) (2.81) (1.83)  (6.57) (1.99)* (2.51) (2.61)  (4.88)* (1.56) (1.02) (0.50) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -6.37 -5.08 -1.05 1.12  -8.60 -4.25 -2.10 0.50  -1.72 1.46 -0.60 0.35 
 (6.93) (2.77) (2.84) (1.84)  (5.12) (2.10)* (2.33) (2.88)  (1.91) (1.53) (0.99) (0.51) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -9.74 -6.61 -0.43 1.54  -4.49 -2.64 -0.66 -2.46  6.23 2.54 -0.86 0.38 
 (6.91) (2.78)* (2.85) (1.85)  (6.06) (2.28) (2.59) (2.62)  (4.15) (1.59) (0.92) (0.47) 
               
Observations 45,564  17,099  29,802 
R-Square 0.27   0.02   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital outcomes.  The treatment group is derived 
from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is 
derived from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in marriage between 
groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes 
from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage dissolution, conditional on being 
married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
 
 
Table 7               
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age and Mortality: Females Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married  B. Formation  C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59  20-44 20-44 45-59 45-59 
Deceased by 1990 Yes No Yes No   Yes No Yes No   Yes No Yes No 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 15.03 -17.19 -14.00 -16.36  18.18 -1.97 0.34 2.64  -2.10** 4.01 0.23 1.29 
 (4.98)* (3.03)* (3.85)* (2.25)*  (14.89) (2.16) (1.67) (1.50)  (0.28) (2.21) (1.03) (0.83) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -9.64 0.52 -2.52 -0.04  -15.57 1.30 2.14 -1.87  0.41 -2.54 0.13 -0.78 
 (8.68) (4.25) (5.39) (3.10)  (17.20) (3.00) (2.83) (1.81)  (0.36) (2.83) (1.42) (1.04) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -4.87 0.39 -1.30 -0.63  -4.94 -0.09 1.98 -0.21  0.02 -2.29 -0.14 0.75 
 (7.80) (4.29) (5.39) (3.11)  (19.30) (2.97) (2.79) (2.03)  (0.37) (2.89) (1.42) (1.26) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -4.25 -3.20 1.33 -0.53  -24.72 -2.94 1.30 -2.18  3.81 1.15 0.34 0.80 
 (7.56) (4.26) (5.41) (3.12)  (15.01) (2.84) (2.76) (1.87)  (3.38) (3.22) (1.45) (1.23) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -10.97 -5.63 1.19 -1.27  -24.95 -3.45 -1.34 -2.32  7.45 0.48 1.34 0.52 
 (8.07) (4.26) (5.44) (3.13)  (14.98) (2.74) (1.76) (1.80)  (4.85) (3.19) (1.76) (1.21) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -17.91 -10.53 -0.43 -2.07  -26.31 -5.92 -2.22 -4.49  7.96 4.08 2.45 0.97 
 (8.41)* (4.24)* (5.48) (3.15)  (14.96) (2.60)* (1.77) (1.65)*  (5.13) (3.60) (2.05) (1.30) 
               
Observations 41,952  16,091  27,076 
R-Square 0.18   0.03   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital outcomes.  The treatment group is derived 
from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is 
derived from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in marriage between 
groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes 
from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage dissolution, conditional on being 
married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
 
Table 8      
Health Conditions by Sex and Age, New Beneficiary Survey 
 Males  Females 
  20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59 
Sensory 31.12 45.35  35.88 42.34 
(1) Blindness or eye trouble (1.78) (1.29)  (2.77) (1.88) 
(2) Cataracts or glaucoma      
(3) Deafness or trouble hearing      
Musculoskeletal 61.94 74.80  59.80 80.49 
(4) Missing appendage (1.87) (1.13)  (2.83) (1.51) 
(5) Bone of muscle condition      
(6) Stiffness or deformity      
Nervous System 31.56 18.40  28.24 14.16 
(7) Multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy (1.79) (1.01)  (2.60) (1.33) 
(8) Other paralysis      
Lung      
(9) Asthma, emphysema 16.52 31.74  15.28 29.19 
Lung: asthma, emphysema (1.43) (1.21)  (2.08) (1.73) 
Digestive system 29.50 37.87  30.90 41.18 
(10) Gallbladder, stomach, kidney, liver (1.75) (1.26)  (2.67) (1.87) 
Cancer      
(11) Cancer or growth not already 
mentioned 5.01 7.28  6.31 11.71 
Mental illness   (0.84) (0.67)  (1.40) (1.22) 
(12) Nervous or emotional problem 38.50 36.05  42.19 38.58 
 (1.87) (1.25)  (2.85) (1.85) 
Heart 35.99 74.19  34.88 66.04 
(13) Heart attack (1.84) (1.14)  (2.75) (1.80) 
(14) Heart problem      
      
Observations 678 1,484   301 692 
The data come from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries of the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program.  All estimates are in percent, unless otherwise noted.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 9         
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age: Males Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married    B. Formation   C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -9.82** -5.04  -0.78 1.75  0.46 -0.23 
 (2.49) (2.60)  (2.43) (2.96)  (1.14) (1.01) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -1.44 -3.36  0.72 -0.20  0.13 -1.09 
 (3.42) (3.63)  (3.15) (3.54)  (1.65) (1.37) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -1.30 -2.01  -1.40 -0.27  0.30 0.92 
 (3.45) (3.64)  (3.23) (3.93)  (1.53) (1.36) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -4.11 -1.69  -8.03** -7.58*  3.57 1.25 
 (3.53) (3.68)  (3.04) (3.68)  (1.84) (1.32) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -6.21 -2.75  -4.91 -2.77  2.06 1.95 
 (3.54) (3.70)  (3.15) (3.77)  (1.84) (1.45) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -7.01* -1.28  -1.17 -1.88  2.45 -0.73 
 (3.57) (3.71)  (3.44) (3.68)  (1.74) (1.42) 
         
Observations 45,564  17,099  29,802 
R-Square 0.27   0.02   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital 
outcomes.  The treatment group is derived from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries 
of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is derived from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in 
marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome 
variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
 
Table 10 
Event-Study Model of Marriage and Disability by Age: Females Ages 20 to 59 
 A. Married   B. Formation  C. Dissolution 
Age 20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59   20-44 45-59 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 -13.50** -18.87**  0.23 5.11  3.48 2.06 
 (4.04) (4.25)  (3.29) (2.88)  (2.56) (2.19) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−3 -5.59 -6.80  -0.75 -6.10  -1.47 0.26 
 (5.60) (5.95)  (4.39) (3.78)  (3.21) (2.51) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
−2 -1.99 -3.57  -0.96 -3.88  -4.53 -2.26 
 (5.68) (5.97)  (4.23) (3.91)  (3.31) (3.00) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0  -3.18 0.77  -6.61 -6.52  1.18 -1.04 
 (5.72) (6.01)  (3.81) (3.36)  (3.42) (2.65) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1  -5.94 -0.07  -5.70 -5.19  1.23 0.96 
 (5.71) (6.04)  (3.84) (3.50)  (3.95) (2.96) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  -12.21* -2.98  -8.21* -7.11*  6.18 3.35 
 (5.71) (6.07)  (3.77) (3.22)  (4.09) (3.20) 
         
Observations 41,952  16,091  27,076 
R-Square 0.18   0.03   0.01 
The estimates are derived from an event-study measuring the dynamic effect of disability on marital 
outcomes.  The treatment group is derived from the New Beneficiary Survey, limited to new beneficiaries 
of the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.  The comparison group is derived from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.  The coefficient on the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 measures the difference in 
marriage between groups in period -1, the year before disability onset.  The coefficients on the variables 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜏𝜏  measure the differential change in marital outcomes from period -1 to 𝜏𝜏.  In panel A, the outcome 
variable is an indicator of marriage; in panel B, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
formation, conditional on being non-married; in panel C, the outcome variable is an indicator of marriage 
dissolution, conditional on being married.  All estimates are factored by 100.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
 
